Hillbilly Report
Glendale, Kentucky
August 15, 2007
www.hillbillyreport.com
www.ditchmitchky.com
By Ron Leach
"Now you have narco drug lords who are
helping to finance the Taliban, so we’ve got to get the job done there, and that
requires us to have enough troops that we are not just air raiding villages and
killing civilians, which is causing enormous problems there." Senator Barrack
Obama
These words from the Democratic
presidential hopeful have sparked angry debate and questions on the senator’s
foreign policy knowledge and lack of forethought or verbal discretion.
The following list outlines the
difficulties faced as we seek to defeat the Afghanistan
anti-governmental/insurgent forces:
1. Inadequate
Forces and Resources Committed
2. ISAF
(International Security Assistance Force) Ineffectiveness
3. Poppy
Eradication without Economic Alternatives
4. Taliban and
Al Qaeda Sanctuaries
5. Short reach
and marginal legitimacy of the Kabul Government
6. Losing the
Information Operations campaign
The ongoing war in
Afghanistan, now in its sixth year, continues to be a formidable challenge. We
are often in a hold what you have pattern with insufficient combat forces to
hold and secure territory, insufficient funds for the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan to pay Afghan soldiers and police, and too few resources generally
to effectively suppress the reemerging Taliban strength while simultaneously
rebuilding this nation. Our coalition partners under the leadership of ISAF are
often in a defensive posture and have allowed a generally non-permissive
operational environment to develop over an ever widening portion of Afghanistan
under their watch while the Taliban reemerges in, strength, logistic support and
trained effectiveness. The ISAF command is hobbled by ill-defined command
authority and a severe lack of unity of mission.
The NATO force commitment
to the ISAF in Afghanistan is only 80 percent fulfilled, and that 80 percent is
far less effective than their numbers would suggest secondary to a defensive
posture, restrictive roles of engagement and deployment of troops dictated by
each separate nation represented rather than by the evolving tactical situation
as seen by the ISAF overall commander on the ground. The nations from which
these forces are derived are generally risk adverse. Forces in the relatively
passive areas are prevented by their national governments from redeploying into
Afghan insurgent strong holds. ISAF and NATO forces in the south often operate
under standard procedures which require them to disengage whenever confronted by
insurgent forces, which precludes any decisive engagement to eliminate the
Taliban and leaves the Taliban with the reasonable perception that these forces
are of no threat to them. The Taliban capture (approximately one year ago) of
the South Afghan city of Musa Qala in the heart of the ISAF/British established
“safe haven” and “cease fire” zone within the Helmand Province is an example of
this relative ineffectiveness. Many lives will be lost during operations to
retake this city; lives which would have been spared by appropriate security and
proper world attention. The Taliban’s ideology is wholly inconsistent with any
semblance of human dignity, respect for basic human rights, civil liberty,
tolerance or any other requisite underpinnings of liberal democracy. The notion
that we, our coalition partners or the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan can hope
to procure long term peace and the expectation of a life worth living for the
Afghan people through negotiation and appeasement with the Taliban (or any such
radical ideology of hate and intolerance) is dangerously misguided.
Another factor complicating
our operations is our ongoing poppy eradication efforts. While it is true that
the majority of the poppy trade is controlled by and funds the ongoing
insurgency, it is also true that our eradication efforts are counterproductive
in our efforts to win popular support for the legitimate IRoA (Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan) Government in Kabul. This is due to a “cart before the horse”
flaw in our strategy. While the poppy trade is an abhorrent reality here, it is
the only viable income for a great many Afghans. Our failure to establish
overall security and then bring economic opportunities through development prior
to our eradication makes us a threat to the livelihood of a substantial portion
of the population, and thus makes them a reluctant asset to the Taliban even if,
given an alternative, they would like very much to see the insurgency end.
In this regard, the
situation here parallels our failure in Iraq. Both countries are caught in an
intractable insurgency secondary first to an inadequate security situation and
secondly due to the failure to bring economic development and opportunity to the
population which can only follow requisite security. Security is prerequisite to
all else in a war against an insurgency. Sustainable progress can never be
achieved in an environment which is relatively permissive to the insurgent. As
long as they can demonstrate a relative freedom of movement and the ability to
strike terror indiscriminately seemingly when and where they choose, you can
never advance the cause of freedom. As long as those working with you towards a
better life can be targeted, your efforts will be thwarted. And as long as the
insurgents can maintain an element of hopelessness and demonstrate to the
population your inability to guarantee their safety they will always be able to
recruit as the only viable economic choice and sell their radical ideology
amongst the poverty, ignorance and despair, (the breeding grounds for
terrorism). In Iraq, road side bombs are often placed by the economic refugee
seeking only to provide for their families and often with no ideological
motivation. In Afghanistan an otherwise benign local family is intimidated into
providing safe housing for Taliban fighter or allowing weapons caches while
detesting all that the Taliban represents. These apolitical/ non-ideologue
Afghans then become the collateral casualties of strikes on Taliban positions
and insurgent propaganda gold mines as they then gladly display these victims as
a information operations coup which further intimidates the population and
causes the world to question our tactics, procedures and purpose here.
So, I agree with Senator
Obama’s assertion : "Now you have
narco drug lords who are helping to finance the Taliban, so we’ve got to get the
job done there, and that requires us to have enough troops….. . Where
I and many pundits and soldier would differ with the Senator his the remaining
portion of his statement: ….. that we are not just air raiding
villages and killing civilians, which is causing enormous problems there."
It is with this portion of the statement
that the young freshman senator reveals a dangerous lack of understanding of the
power of words, the secondary and tertiary effects of his statements and the
shear inaccuracy of such assertions. We are often behind the power curve on the
Information Operations aspect of the counter insurgency operations. IO – for the
healthy skeptics among you – is not propaganda. It is simply an attempt to get
your message and the truth of your intentions and actions out to the population
you seek to influence. Ill-informed public figures and a too quick to report
media are the tools of our advisories in this IO war against our efforts and our
national interest. While Senator’s verbal miss-steps pale in comparison to other
public figure during conflicts of our past, he has once again demonstrated his
naivety and statesmanship inexperience. This latest example follows just on the
heels of his statements which threaten to undermine Musharif – a regional ally
struggling to survive and at grave personal risk as he attempts to operate
between his vision of modernity and moderation (regionally speaking) vs radical
Islam which threatens to overthrow his government. (currently Pakistani forces
are providing vital forces in blocking positions as we engage a sizable
consolidation of Taliban forces in the Tora Bora region of NE Afghanistan). I
concur with the Senator that in situations were the Pakistani government is
unable or unwilling to act on solid “actionable” intelligence that we must be
prepared to act swiftly to accomplish that which is in our national interest.
Where the issue lies are in the Senator’s lack of sensitivity or apparent
oblivious disregard for the repercussions that public statement of our ability
and intention to act has on Musharif and the region.
I
have personally witnessed that the world media – BBC, US Media, Canadian media,
and of course Al Jazeera are quick to broadcast the insurgents claims and are
slow to post quiet buried retractions once we demonstrate that the accusations
are false. A case in point: Late last fall a US element came under attack by a
sizable insurgent element in the Panjway Province of southern Afghanistan some
weeks after operation Medusa in the same area. Our forces engaged the enemy
with the significant fire power which we carry on our GMV/HUMVEE’s. The
retreating insurgents were also engaged decisively with close air support. As
the surviving insurgents evaded, a significant number of fighters were seen
entering a single thick mud walled structure isolated form any population
center. The structure was impenetrable to our ground weapons. There was no
evidence of non-combatant presence in this structure. The building was observed
for an extended period of time by the ground force which observed insurgent
security elements dispatched in four directions around the building. The
building was observed by over head surveillance which then turned surveillance
over to an armed aircraft. The consensus of the ground force and the over head
observers was that there was no evidence of non-combatants in the area. The
target was briefed to higher command which gave the ground team authorization to
“go hot” on the target based on the rigorous and exhaustive rule-out of
“freindlies” which had been conducted over several hours. The target was
engaged by air support. Upon the ground forces sweep of the target there were
four non-combatant wounded found within the structure. Medical care was
immediately rendered and Air Medical Evacuation immediately dispatched to
transport the casualties to the nearest coalition hospital. All casualties
survived, were given the same superb medical care which would be given any US or
Coalition casualty and reparations were paid due to the injuries sustained.
This is in a nut shell the events as they occurred. Every prudent precaution is
made to mitigate the potential for non-combatant collateral injuries and once,
in this instance, these precautions proved to have failed, the injured promptly
received the best medical care available in theater.
This however is not the story
which quickly spread throughout the world media. The Taliban quickly dispatched
the story which without hesitation was picked up by the media and many news
papers which accused US forces of wounding and or killing 100 innocent
civilians. The ensuing investigation demonstrated the facts of the incident as I
have described them. The print media did, over several days and within ever
increasing obscure pages of there publications, down grade the casualty count -
initially to approximately 60, then to 30, then finally to eight – four of which
were fighting age males with gun shot wounds (sustained in their initial attack
on our forces – ie they were insurgents) leaving the four casualties as we had
initially reported.
Unfortunately the damage of
misreporting can have deep and lasting damage to our efforts. Perception often
overwhelms reality. I have great respect for the role of the media as the watch
dog, often described as the forth branch of our government for the vital
oversight they provide. However, sloppy reporting in the competitive world of
the continuous news cycle and ill-considered statements by public figures can be
dangerous.
The unit I currently serve
with has been much more effective in establishing security and stability in our
areas of operation than our hamstrung coalition counterparts. We have a duel
paths approach that we employ in our efforts to meet our objectives. We are
quite effective at the direct action combat side of the war as one path
(arguably more so than any other element on the ground here). The fore mentioned
Operation Madusa is one example. We successfully broke the Taliban strong hold
in that region, have established a permanent Afghan centered security presence
in the province and have denied the insurgents territory critical to them as a
launching point for operations against Afghanistan’s largest southern city of
Kandahar. We are also uniquely proficient at non-force methods as a second and
jointly orchestrated synergistic path in our efforts to bring security and
stability to Afghanistan. These methods include humanitarian relief,
infrastructure development and expanded medical capabilities extended to the
communities in our areas of operations.
During our previous rotation
and operations over approximately seven months, we delivered approximately
119,500 of humanitarian aid and treated nearly 22,000 local national patients in
the numerous medical clinics we have established in our area of operations. The
only news organization that came to one of my clinics during this rotation was
Al Jazara. I am unaware of any reporting of out humanitarian accomplishments
reported by the major media.
I commend Senator Obama’s call
for forces structures commensurate with the task at hand. I implore him to speak
with greater discretion on things he does not know and consider the implications
of his words. I ask him to error on the side of caution and have faith in our
forces that we are ever aware of the risk to non-combatants. Our roles of
engagement, values, sense of humanity and the gravity of our mission drive our
actions with a vigilance to minimize the suffering of innocent lives.
Ron Leach
Hillbilly Report
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